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0. Introduction 
My question is: what is the relationship between a sentence and a propo-
sition? This suggests, on the one hand, that there is such a relationship, 
and, on the other hand, that the relationship is substantial. In what fol-
lows, I want to dwell on this relationship, though I have to admit from 
the beginning that I have some doubts that the idea can be worked out in 
any rewarding way. Thus, the aim of this paper is to scrutinise potential 
ways to elucidate the problem and, by using the approach in question, 
give support to my doubts. 
The question I want to investigate is connected with the discussion of 
what the primary bearers of truth are. Should we ascribe truth to sen-
tences, propositions, utterances, statements, beliefs, or judgements? The 
list of potential candidates is long and each has its advocates and oppo-
nents. As interesting as this question seems to be, I have doubts that it 
can be answered in a way that is detached from any theory or frame-
work. But it goes without saying that if one sticks with the idea that 
there is a relationship between a sentence and a proposition expressed by 
an utterance, then one considers propositions to be the object to which 
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truth and falsity is ascribed in the first place. This calls for a clarifica-
tion: nothing hinges on the terms sentence, proposition, etc. or on the 
phrase that a sentence expresses a proposition. The essence of this 
phrase seems to be the introduction of an intermediary level, or as Stal-
naker puts it, an “extra step on the road from sentences to truth values” 
(Stalnaker 1970: 36). It is precisely this that propositions as falling apart 
from sentences come up to and it is exactly this idea the present paper 
will be concerned with. 
I do not want to create an impression that neither the simile of an in-
termediary nor the question of how to spell it out is new or uncontrover-
sial. David Lewis, for instance, criticises Stalnaker for giving a “mis-
leading impression of simplicity” (Lewis 1980:39), for Stalnaker does 
not pay sufficient attention to the rules according to which we yield the 
content of a sentence relative to a context. However, in the end, he pro-
claims “solidarity forever” (Lewis 1980: 42). The idea of intermediaries 
appears in different guises and in different branches of philosophy. For 
instance, Tyler Burge in “Perceptual Entitlement” (2003) defends the 
idea of the existence of an intermediary between objects in the world and 
a subject having a belief about them. In contemporary theories of inter-
pretation, many philosophers and linguists trace their approaches back to 
Frege’s distinction between sense and reference. Although this is not 
Frege’s line of reasoning, the introduction of such a distinction or one or 
more intermediaries might be justified by the use of a class of expression 
suggesting that the idea of such a second dimension would be required. 
The examples par excellence are so-called indexical expressions such as 
‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘this’, whose semantic value changes from context to 
context. From this it follows that the meaning of sentences containing 
these expressions – or in Fregean terminology, the thought they express 
– changes. The role of an intermediary such as a proposition then is to 
allow for a relativisation of sentences to contexts as expressing different 
propositions. Consider (1): 
(1) This is white. 
Depending on the reference of ‘this’, two utterances of the sentence (1) 
might express different propositions. From this example, it is easy to get 
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to the conclusion that an intermediary level is not only innocuous, but 
required in order to grasp the variation. To put it generally, an interme-
diary level is supposed to wipe out all deficiencies of natural languages, 
which forestall obstinately a clear grasp of what is meant by an utterance 
of a sentence. This is achieved, in the case of an utterance of (1), simply 
by taking the semantic value of ‘this’ as the constituent of a (structured) 
proposition expressed by a sentence. The first impression is, admittedly, 
that this approach is innocuous, but this holds only if the fact that the in-
teresting part just begins here is not neglected, by which I mean ques-
tions such as how names and indexical expressions are related to the ob-
jects they are supposed to refer to, how sentences or propositions are 
supposed to be true depending on the contributions of their parts, and – 
if one holds that sentences and propositions stand apart – how they are 
related. 
1. Sentences and Propositions in Theory 
The construction of sentences and propositions and a relationship be-
tween them is inherent to theories that grant a decisive influence to an 
utterance’s context. However, the crux of the matter lies within the de-
tails and poses a serious dilemma for these theories. The dilemma goes 
as follows: either the contextual influence is tied in some way to the sen-
tence, which makes the appeal to propositions as distinctive entities vain, 
or, on the other hand, the role of sentences remains in the dark if the 
context contributes to the proposition independently, i.e. irrespective of 
the sentence which is supposed to express the proposition. 
There might be good reasons to ascribe truth to propositions and not to 
sentences and hence to take the burden of explaining the transition from 
sentences to propositions. But since I have doubts that the debate can be 
settled in a general way, I will not discuss this question in isolation from 
theories appealing to this distinction. What I have claimed so far is that 
the idea of propositions as a paradigm for intermediacy is harmless if the 
relationship between sentences and propositions is explicated. One 
might object that it is the explanation of the use of expressions which 
fulfils the task of explaining how a proposition is expressed. But if so, 
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then it is at least questionable to introduce intermediaries, for one can 
handle these questions without the ado of shady devices. 
An alternative to an assessment of the relationship between sentences 
and propositions in isolation is a discussion of how such a framework 
might fit into a comprehensive theory of interpretation. This is suggest-
ed, too, by the fact that the classification of expressions and the use of 
technical terms such as sentence, proposition, context, etc. are already 
part and parcel of a comprehensive theory of interpretation, at least su-
perficially. This shifts the discussion closer to actual theories of lan-
guage which make use of frameworks built on the basis of different lev-
els, thereby endowing each level with a particular explanatory function. 
A further reason for examining the framework in the light of a particu-
lar theory is that if the terms sentence and proposition are not mere syn-
onyms, a third factor is required which ‘makes all the difference’. The 
third factor is supposed to explain the fact that different propositions are 
expressed by the same sentence. If there is no factor in respect of which 
different propositions are expressed, the difference between sentences 
and propositions is annihilated. But the appeal to this factor comes to 
nothing if the functioning of this factor remains a mere postulation and 
this functioning is to be explained by a theory of meaning. 
Recently, a great deal of attention has been dedicated to the context of 
an utterance. I allude here to theories which dedicate ample room to the 
workings of contextual contributions for the determination of a proposi-
tion expressed by a sentence. These theories come in various grades of 
sophistication, but I will consider them in their simplest form. What is 
central to these theories is, in first place, a dismissive attitude towards 
traditional accounts of truth-conditional theories of interpretation. For 
the contention is that traditional theories neglect the role that the context
of an utterance plays when it comes to explaining the meaning of utter-
ances of the same sentence. From a different perspective, the notion of 
context, applied correctly, ought to perform the function of bridging the 
gap between mere sentences and the propositions expressed in a particu-
lar context. Irrespective of whether this kind of criticism is adequate, 
two positions on the extremes can be distinguished: the first, named lit-
eralism or minimalism, allows little or no contextual impact on the truth 
conditions of a sentence: contextual enrichment is limited to indexical 
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expressions like ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’ or other ‘triggers’ at the logical level 
of a sentence. The opposite end of the spectrum is represented by con-
textualism: its governing thesis is that sentences are not truth evaluable 
unless they are completed and enriched by the context: truth conditions 
should be ascribed only to speech acts which are considered to be qua
speech act in context. Despite the fierce debates and fundamental disa-
greements concerning the proper integration of contextual contributions 
in a comprehensive theory of interpretation, these theories are united by 
a commitment to a framework akin to the one discussed above. For in-
stance, when presenting the tenets of their minimalism, Cappelen and 
Lepore maintain that 
[…] the semantic content of a sentence S is the proposition that all utteranc-
es of S express. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 2) 
Ironically, they explicitly refrain from explaining how such a (minimal) 
proposition is yielded. Although Cappelen’s and Lepore’s support for 
minimal propositions comes from different premises, this cannot free 
them from the question of how a minimal proposition is expressed or 
involved in the utterance of a sentence. That such an explanation is cru-
cial is shown by the debate concerning the role of a minimal proposition 
if one and the same sentence is uttered both ironically and seriously. Put-
ting the dubious notion of minimal proposition aside, what should be 
granted to minimalists is the restriction of contextual contributions to a 
set of expressions. One aspect of this is a taming of contextual impacts, 
but, and this seems to be more important here, they put the focus on 
what I might call the receptiveness of contextual contributions. I will ad-
dress this point later in the paper. 
Compared with minimalism, contextualism – be it in a radical or mod-
erate version – is more liberal about the context contributing to a propo-
sition expressed by a sentence. The core of these theories is that the con-
text of utterance is, literally speaking, indispensable for the constitution 
of a proposition. As Recanati writes 
[...] there is no level of meaning which is both (i) propositional (truth-
evaluable) and (ii) minimalist, that is, unaffected by top-down factors. (Re-
canati 2004: 90) 
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Top-down factors are those contextual supplements which are not de-
manded by an expression, neither at the sentence’s level nor within the 
hidden structure of a sentence. To put it counterfactually, without contri-
butions of these kinds, no proposition is expressed, i.e. there is no truth 
value to assign. And it is a cardinal error, so the contextualist’s story 
goes on, to ascribe a truth value to an entity which is not capable to be 
true or false. This line of criticism is substantiated by countless stories 
told in order to show how the context of utterance is supposed to influ-
ence the proposition expressed, or, in terms of truth-conditional seman-
tics, how truth conditions vary with regard to contexts of utterance. 
2. Truth-conditional Semantics and Context 
What is often ignored in this context is the resonant question of what de-
termines truth conditions. Shall we leave this to the context exclusively, 
as radical contextualists suggest? And if so, is the name ‘truth condition-
al semantics’ still appropriate or should ‘context conditional semantics’ 
be used instead? Be that as it may, the issue of the dependence of truth 
conditions seems to invoke a truism, for truth conditions are determined 
or constituted by whatever we say is true or false. And this, I will argue, 
poses a serious problem for the proponents of contextualism. In order to 
elucidate my point, I will adopt (2) as a basic scheme to state truth con-
ditions: 
(2) s is true if and only if p 
In (2), p serves as a placeholder for the truth conditions of s. Or, to be 
precise, p depends on whatever s refers to. In the rudimentary classifica-
tion presented above, s either refers to a sentence (in the case of literal-
ism or minimalism) or to a speech act (in the case of contextualism) 
which is qua definition in context and which expresses a proposition. 
Whatever the exact definition of the terms sentence, speech act, etc., it 
seems that Recanati is right in arguing that at least some sentences do 
not express any content or proposition at all, which comes down to the 
fact that they are not truth-evaluable. As the most obvious reasons for 
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 22.03.16 15:07
Sentence, Proposition, and Context. On the Idea of an Intermediate Level 247 
not ascribing a truth-value contextualists refer to indexical expressions
and other expressions requiring contextual completion. Sentences con-
taining one of these expressions are not truth-evaluable unless we know 
the reference and since we can only find out the reference in a particular 
context, i.e. if uttered at a particular time and place accompanied with 
the appropriate gestures, truth conditions are underdetermined unless 
enriched by the context. As Recanati puts it: 
Indexical sentences possess a determinate (truth-evaluable) content only 
when uttered. Hence it is not obvious that such sentences, qua grammatical 
entities, possess content. (Recanati 2005: 172) 
But Recanati appeals to the context as not only assigning a semantic val-
ue to a restricted range of expressions but also as a generic term for all 
kinds of ‘fill-ins’ which are alluded to in order to bridge the gap between 
linguistic meaning of a sentence and the meaning of an utterance or a 
speech act for which the term proposition is reserved. It follows from 
this that the framework Recanati appeals to requires a falling apart along 
the lines presented above. Generally, this is precisely the reason why 
contextualists have to appeal to a framework with intermediary levels. 
By integrating this in the scheme (2), one gets 
(3) “the proposition expressed by s relative to context c” is true if 
and only if p. 
Following this path, s might refer to something like a semantic potential 
or a sentence-token which is, according to contextualism, not meaning-
ful in isolation; i.e. only when uttered in a particular context. For this 
reason, it is incorporated into a meaningful complex as being suitable to 
be either true or false. Alternatively, s in (2) refers to the entire complex 
on the left-hand side of the biconditional statement (3). 
My initial question was how the assumed relationship between sen-
tences and propositions might be worked out. This becomes even more 
important when considering that the context cannot add something to the 
right-hand side, viz. the truth conditions, which are not determined by s
or the complex on the right-hand side. To put it in a different way, if p is 
determined entirely by the left part of a biconditional statement, the con-
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text does not have anything to add to p which is not yet embodied in s 
(or in the left part of the bi-conditional statement). On the other hand, 
the complex on the left-hand side cannot be incomplete, i.e. in need of 
contextual completion, for one of the central objections contextualists 
raise against traditional theories is that traditionalists assign a truth value 
to something which is not capable to be true or false. This, in turn, plac-
es the focus on the complex on the left part of (3) and on the question of 
how different propositions are expressed relative to different contexts. 
A great deal of contextualists’ turmoil stems from the countless stories 
told and comparisons of two utterances of the same sentence in different 
contexts. The aim of these stories is to show that the truth conditions of 
the sentence vary if some features of the story alter. One kind of exam-
ple concerns the use of so-called gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’, ‘hot’, 
etc. It goes as follows: At first we are invited to imagine an utterance of 
a sentence, such as “Sarah is tall” in the context of a group of children. 
The utterance turns out to be true, for Sarah is growing fast compared to 
the other children in the group. Now imagine the same Sarah surrounded 
by a group of basketball players – the utterance of the sentence “Sarah is 
tall” now appears to be false, for Sarah is not tall compared to basketball 
players. Since Sarah does not shrink between both situations, contextual-
ists conclude that the truth conditions of the sentence “Sarah is tall” are 
influenced by the context – otherwise we could not explain the change of 
the truth-value. The intention of telling these stories is to undermine the 
idea that truth conditions are determined by the (literal) meaning of an 
utterance of “Sarah is tall”. And even if one disagrees with contextualists 
in respect of this line of criticism of traditional theories, one might still 
follow the contextualists’ strategy, for it is hard to deny that at least 
sometimes the phrase “it depends on the context” is appropriate. The 
idea seems to be that both utterances share a sentence-type and that both 
utterances instantiate a token of that type. Such a token expresses a 
proposition relative to a context and the context becomes relevant for the 
determination of the proposition expressed in a yet to be determined 
way. Thus we can formulate biconditional statements such as: 
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(4) The token of the sentence-type “Sarah is tall” relative to context 
c1 expresses that the proposition p is true if and only if Sarah is 
tall in context c1. 
The different contexts are supposed to explain that two utterances of the 
sentence-type “Sarah is tall” express different propositions. But how can 
this be spelled out? 
A contextualist might argue that the proposition itself has nothing to 
do with the sentence uttered. This would simply mean that the contextu-
alist denies the existence of a relationship between a sentence and the 
proposition. As odd as this might sound, it is not completely alien to 
contextualist thought. It comes down to the idea that the expressions 
used in an utterance are not necessarily involved in the proposition ex-
pressed. Some proponents of radical contextualism argue along these 
lines, for in contrast to proponents of moderate contextualism they hold 
that the context affects the proposition expressed even if there is no 
counterpart of it on the sentential level. As Recanati puts it: 
Free enrichment is only one type of case in which a pragmatic process that 
is optional (in contrast to the contextual assignment of values to indexicals 
and free variables of all sorts) nevertheless affects the proposition ex-
pressed. (Recanati 2012: 71)
These contributions seem to represent a fourth level in the picture laid 
down, but this does not necessarily concern my question of how a prop-
osition emerges from a sentence. On the other hand, any explanation of 
such a fourth factor remains problematic. 
Another strategy to literally circumvent the issue might be to put the 
focus on the distinction between a sentence-type and its different tokens, 
which shifts propositions closer to sentence-tokens. However, in order to 
preserve the instantiation relation between a sentence-type and its to-
kens, the context cannot affect the sentence-tokens, for then they are no 
longer instances of the same sentence-type. One might argue that this is 
not so much a problem for advocates of contextualism, for they endorse 
a distinction between sentences and propositions, which does not bear on 
the distinction between types and tokens of sentences per se. This an-
swer is not open to contextualists unless they state what the common 
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features of utterances across different contexts are. In other words, con-
textualists have to retain both ideas – the type-token-distinction of sen-
tences and the idea of contextual contributions to the proposition ex-
pressed. However, in order to do so, the sentence must be in some way 
open or receptive to contextual supplements. On the one hand, the type-
token-distinction requires an instantiation-relation, and on the other 
hand, the sentence must be in some way involved in the process of the 
determination of the proposition. 
3. Indexical Expressions and Contextual Supplements
The class of indexical expressions seems to be predestined to satisfy 
both requirements. One ‘part’ of them remains fixed across contexts and 
the other ‘part’ varies, if used in an utterance, from context to context. 
This finds expression, most famously, in David Kaplan’s distinction be-
tween content and character. According to his theory, the character of 
an indexical expression is a function which delivers, relative to a con-
text, the content, i.e. the referee, of an indexical expression. 
But it is obvious that the sentence “Sarah is tall” does not contain any 
of what normally counts as an indexical expression. The contextualist 
detour might be via the logical form of the sentence under discussion. 
We find this strategy, for instance, in Stanley (2005): 
[…] all effects of extra-linguistic context on the truth-conditions of an as-
sertion are traceable to logical form. (Stanley 2005: 33) 
[…] the effects of context on the truth-conditional interpretation of an asser-
tion are restricted to assigning values to elements in the expression uttered. 
Each such element brings with it rules governing what context can and can-
not assign to it […]. (Stanley 2005: 34) 
The rationale for tracing contextual contributions back to the logical 
form of a sentence is that some contextualists see in unconstrained con-
textual contributions a threat to the principle of compositionality. In or-
der to restrict them, they trace these contributions back to elements of 
the sentence. 
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Placing explanatory weight on the logical level of a sentence involves 
the introduction of an additional level on the way to propositions. But 
even here ‘counterparts’ are required, both on the logical level and on 
the level of the sentence in order to explain the workings of all the con-
tributions at all levels. The first task, then, is to reveal the ‘real structure’ 
of a sentence and to discover parts (hidden indexical expressions) or 
gaps at the logical level which ought to be filled or completed by the 
context.  
In order to scrutinize this strategy, I take up the issue of Sarah’s 
height. The context ought to provide the comparison class in relation to 
which Sarah is either tall or not. Following Stanley’s strategy, the postu-
lation of gaps or hidden indexical expressions places this version of con-
textualism closer to minimalism with the only difference that the class of 
indexical expressions is expanded. But what constitutes an indexical ex-
pression, be it on the surface or on the hidden level of a sentence? It is 
crucial to emphasise this point, for an element of a sentence cannot be 
simply a variable. For it runs counter to the idea that sentences represent 
a complex entity. Sentences do not carry variables – “Sara is tall relative 
to ” just is not a sentence. This also holds for ‘sentences’ with gaps to 
be filled. Thus, the last alternative might well involve understanding 
these elements as indexical expressions. This is precisely what Stanley is 
claiming when he states that: 
Broadly construed, an indexical is any contextual parameter, by which I 
mean any primitive expression whose denotation is supplied entirely by 
context, perhaps guided by a linguistic rule. (Stanley 2005: 38)  
To specify an indexical expression in a narrow sense, Stanley draws on 
the ‘method’ used by minimalists – he simply makes a list: 
In the narrow sense of “indexical”, an indexical is a proper subset of con-
text-sensitive expressions, one with the characteristics shared by words 
such as “I”, “here”, and “now”, but not by “this”, “that”, “she”, and “he”. 
(Stanley 2005: 38) 
However, I do not think that neither the broad nor the narrow under-
standing of indexical expressions is consistent. Firstly, if the group of 
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indexical expressions is construed ‘broadly’, the question arises as to 
what distinguishes them from other singular terms? If the characteristic 
feature of indexical expressions is that the “denotation is supplied entire-
ly by context”, then almost every expression is of this kind. 
With regard to the narrow conception of indexical expressions I want 
to point out that an explanation of the use of indexical expressions is 
more complex than suggests both by minimalists and moderate contex-
tualists. Each indexical expression (or what normally counts as such) 
possesses distinctive features and we cannot declare an expression to be 
an indexical expression unless we specify these particular features. To 
explain this by an example: it is true that my utterance of the sentence “I 
am Stefan” does not contradict another person’s utterance of the sen-
tence “I am not Stefan”. According to contextualism, the reason for this 
is that ‘I’ is context-sensitive, i.e. the semantic value varies from context 
to context or from utterer to utterer. To put it generally, the context pro-
vides the semantic value of ‘I’ and we get biconditional statements like  
(5) “I am Stefan” is true if and only if the speaker of the utterance 
 “I am Stefan” is Stefan. 
However, with such a paraphrase occurs a downgrade – the essential fea-
tures of these expression get lost. Most prominently in the case of the 
first person pronoun, the immunity to error through misidentification is 
ignored. As Hans Sluga puts it: 
But when we are sitting in an auditorium listening to a lecture and I whisper 
into your ear “The person who is now speaking is L.W.”, I don’t mean to be 
saying that I am Ludwig Wittgenstein and you are not likely to be in doubt 
about that. (Sluga 1996: 346f.) 
A similar misidentification cannot happen in the case of ‘I’. Let me put 
this differently; if contextualism were true, sentences such as “I am Stef-
an” would turn out to be identity statements if uttered by a person named 
‘Stefan’. It seems that contextualists have to swallow the pill and attempt 
a paraphrase, for otherwise the appeal to the context grasps at nothing. In 
turn, the appeal to indexical expressions as paradigms for the reality of 
context-sensitivity is also problematic. We neither have exact criteria for 
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what indexical expressions are, while the supposed feature of context-
sensitivity is insufficient to explain various uses of what typically counts 
as an indexical expression. 
4. Conclusion 
Shall we, nevertheless, retain the idea that the context of utterance is rel-
evant in the sense that it determines the truth conditions? In particular, as 
by that we would retain the idea that sentences express proposition as 
well? For the problem with my argumentation might be that this line of 
reasoning throws out the baby with the bath water. The objection might 
be this: if we rule out the application of notions such as ‘sentence’, 
‘proposition’ and ‘context’, we also give up the idea of revealing struc-
tures in natural language utterances. For it can hardly be denied that both 
utterances in the scenario have something in common. The question is, 
however, in virtue of what do both utterances have something in com-
mon? At any rate, the appeal to the context as being decisive for the 
proposition expressed seems to be highly dubious – at least if it is in-
voked to explain tensions resulting from repeating uses of expressions. 
And this makes propositions as a paradigm for intermediacy dubious as 
well. 
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